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AJIL Unbound is pleased to publish an Agora on the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Zivotofsky v. Kerry 
(Zivotofsky II).1 This highly anticipated separation-of-powers decision addresses the validity of  congressional 
action alleged to intrude upon the President’s exclusive power to recognize foreign sovereigns. The petitioner 
in Zivotofsky was born in Jerusalem and wished to have his birthplace designated on his passport as “Israel.” 
Because the Executive branch does not recognize any country’s sovereignty over Jerusalem, the birthplace of  
U.S. citizens born in Jerusalem has been designated on their passports as “Jerusalem.” In 2002, Congress passed 
a statute entitling persons born in Jerusalem to have “Israel” designated in their passports as their place of  
birth. At issue in the case was the validity of  this statute.   
In an earlier decision, Zivotofksy v. Clinton (Zivotofsky I),2 the Court held that the question of  the validity of  the 
statute did not present a nonjusticiable political question. This symposium focuses on the merits decision, 
Zivotofsky II, decided on June 8, 2015. The majority, in an opinion by Justice Kennedy, held that the President’s 
power to recognize foreign sovereigns is exclusive and that Congress’ statute unconstitutionally interfered with 
that power. Chief  Justice Roberts and Justice Scalia wrote dissents, which Justice Alito joined. Both dissents 
expressed skepticism about the majority’s conclusion that the President’s recognition power is exclusive, but, in 
the end, both dissents rested on the conclusion that the statute Congress had enacted did not unconstitutionally 
interfere with that power. (Justice Thomas largely concurred with the majority, albeit on other grounds.) 
The first set of  essays in this Agora offer diverse insights into a variety of  aspects of  the opinions in the 
case. Our contributors from Philadelphia—Peter Spiro of  Temple University Beasley School of  Law and Jean 
Galbraith of  the University of  Pennsylvania School of  Law—both note that the majority opinion departs from 
earlier decisions that had led some scholars to claim that the Roberts Court was “normalizing” Foreign Rela-
tions Law. Spiro frames this departure as a temporary retreat from normalization, while Galbraith sees value in 
the uncertainty produced by the departure. The contribution by Harlan Cohen of  the University of  Georgia 
School of  Law examines the competing visions of  foreign relations law reflected in the opinions of  Justice 
Kennedy’s and Chief  Justice Roberts—the first highly functionalist and the second highly formalist—and the 
role those visions may be playing across the Court’s foreign relations law jurisprudence. The contribution by 
Curtis Bradley of  Duke Law School focuses on what the majority opinion in Zivotofsky tells us about the im-
portance of  historical practice in constitutional interpretation, particularly in the field of  Foreign Relations Law, 
and also describes tensions between a custom-based approach to the separation of  powers and the institution 
of  judicial review. 
A second set of  essays will follow shortly after.  
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